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Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees in Title VII
Actions and the Public Defendant
Congress enacted Title Vi of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to
eliminate employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."' Effective enforcement of the Act depends heavily
upon private plaintiffs. Recognizing that governmental resources are
inadequate for effective public enforcement,3 Congress provided an
incentive for private enforcement.4 A provision of the Act allows federal
courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a Title
VII action.' The United States District Court of Minnesota exercised this
authority when it awarded 81,950,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to the
prevailing class action plaintiffs in Rajender v. University of Minnesota,
546 F. Supp. 158 (D. Minn. 1982).6
The attorneys' fees award inRajender represented a near record for
a civil rights case' and was possibly the largest award ever granted in a
Title VII proceeding. The size of the award resulted principally from the
triple multiplier used to calculate the fees.8 The court ordered the losing
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 17 (1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
3. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
5. Id.
6. Initially, the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota decided to appeal the
decision, but in December, 1982, they decided instead to pursue a settlement. The
University and the plaintiffs' attorneys subsequently agreed to a settlement in January,
1983. The initial district court decision required payment of$1,950,000, plus interest, to be
paid over a two year period. The interest increased the University's actual monetary liability
to $2,400,000. The settlement required the University to pay $1,475,000 immediately.
Minn. Daily, Jan. 26, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
7. See Keith v. Volpe, 86 F.R.D. 565, 568 (C.D. CaL 1980) (an award of $2,200,000
which may be the highest yet in a civil rights case) [hereinafter cited as Kieth].
8. Id. at 575. A multiplier of 3.5 was used in Keith. The higher multipler resulted in part
from two factors not present in Rajender. First, the Rajender court awarded fees at current
hourly rates rather than historic rates. The Keith court awarded fees based on historic rates.
It applied a different rate for each of the nine years of the litigation. Therefore, a high
multiplier compensated for the inflationary impact of non-payment over an extended period
of time. Id. at 577. Since the Rajender court based the fees entirely on hourly rates current at
the end of the litigation, no inflationary adjustment was required. See infra notes 130-92
and accompanying text.
Second, the higher fees in Keith resulted in part from the equitable common fund or
common benefit doctrine. 86 F.R.D. at 572-73. See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying
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defendant University to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys a rate of compen-
sation that was three times their normal rate.9 Courts frequently award
attorneys increased rates of compensation as an incentive to other
attorneys to represent civil rights clients.'0 Nevertheless, multipliers as
large as three are rare in Title VII actions and other civil rights suits.
Multipliers are usually less than two. I" In contrast, courts regularly triple
the attorneys' fees in commercial litigation.' 2 This inequity persists
despite the similar purpose of all fee-shifting statutes: to encourage
private enforcement of congressional policies.' 3
Although Title VII, like other fee-shifting statutes, provides for
reasonable attorneys' fees, Congress has never clearly defined the term
text. The class benefited in Keith was sizeable and benefits conferred considerable. 86
F.R.D. at 572. In this case, a consent decree resulted in the stoppage of a major California
freeway project. Id. at 568. The class benefited was the "State of California and its
inhabitants," id. at 572, and the benefits included, among other things, a $250,000,000
housing project. Id. at 572.
9. Rajender, 546 F. Supp. at 162.
10. See infra note 46.
11. Courts increase attorneys' fees by as much as four times in antitrust actions. Berger,
Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable", 126 U. Pa. L Rev. 281, 290
(1977). A 1975 study found that the mean hourly rate for attorneys in antitrust cases was
$181 compared with only $40 for civil rights cases. Id. at 310 & n. 124. A more recent study
of fifty civil rights cases indicated the hourly rate of recovery (after a multiplier adjustment)
ranged from 83 to 5137.50. Comment Calculation of a Reasonable Award of Attorneys'
Fees Under the Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, 13 J. Mar. L Rev. 331, 378 n.234
(1980). A recent survey of attorneys' fees awards in 186 antitrust and securities class actions
found an average of $213.37 per hour. Attorney Fee Awards in Antitrust and Securities
Class Actions, 6 Class Action Reports 82, 129 (1980). In one compilation of fifteen fee
awards decisions under the antitrust securities acts, only one awarded a multiplier of less
than two. Two cases used a multiplier of four, seven cases used a multiplier of three, and five
cases used a multiplier of two. Brown, Calculation of Attorneys' Fees: Franchise and
Antitrust Relief, 2 W. New Eng. L Rev. 297, 305 n.44 (1979). On the other hand, a survey
of cases in one federal court district found a multiplier used in only three of sixteen civil
rights cases. The highest multiplier awarded was 1.2. Garrison, Attorneys'Fees Under Fee-
Shifting Statutes, 56 Conn. B.J. 66, 77-81 (1982). A triple multiplier as awarded in
Rajender is rare. Only one other reported civil rights decision awarded a higher multiplier.
Keith, 86 F.R.D. at 577 (3.5 multiplier). Although the federal courts have become more
generous in civil rights cases, no other reported opinion awarded a multiplier greater than
two. See infra note 242. See also Ruiz v. Estelle, 553 F. Supp. 567 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(multiplier of two resulted in a fees award of $1,700,000 in a prisoner rights suit).
12. See supra note 11.
13. The attorneys' fees provision for Title VII is representative of the various federal fee-
shifting statutes. The Title VII provision as amended by the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972
provides:
In any action or proceeding under . . . [Title VII] the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the [Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity] Commission or the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States
shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
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"reasonable.""' The courts have struggled to develop a uniform standard
that is understandable, fair, and capable of encouraging private en-
forcement of Title VII and other civil rights laws.' 5 The result has been
wide acceptance by the federal appellate courts of the "adjusted lodestar"
standard," the standard used by the Rajender court.'7
Because the Rajender court dealt with most of the critical issues
regarding fee awards in civil rights litigation, its opinion provides a useful
basis for examining these issues. This note first examines whether the
adjusted lodestar standard is an improvement over previous standards. It
then examines the courts' apparent bias in awarding smaller fees to civil
rights litigants than to other litigants. Additionally, it examines whether
public institutions deserve deferential treatment when assessed attor-
neys' fees as losing defendants. Finally, it examines legislative attempts to
resolve these problems.
Dr. Shymala Rajender filed a class-action employment discrimi-
nation complaint against the University of Minnesota in 1973." Her
complaint alleged that the University denied her a permanent appoint-
ment to the Chemistry Department because of her sex and national
origin." Class action certification followed in 19780 and settlement by
consent decree occurred in February 1980.1 The decree awarded Dr.
14. The Congress missed an opportunity to adopt a specific formula defining
"reasonable" attorneys' fees when it passed the Fees Awards Act in 1976. However, it did
require the same standard for both civil rights cases and antitrust cases. The Senate Report
provided-
It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under S. 2278 be governed by
the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex federal
litigation, such as antitrust cases/...
S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976). The House Report contained similar
language:
Of course, it should be noted the mere recovery of damages should not
preclude the awarding of counsel fees. Under the antitrust laws, for example,
a plaintiff may recover treble damages and still the court is required to award
attorney fees. The same principle should apply here as civil rights plaintiffs
should not be singled out for different and less favorable treatment.
H.R Rep. No. 1558,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 9 (1976).
15. See infra notes 55-96 and accompanying text. See also E. Larson, Federal Court
Awards of Attorney's Fees (1981). This comprehensive work provides a detailed analysis of
the state of the law regarding court awarded attorneys' fees. The author focuses particularly
on fees awards in civil rights cases and provides a separate analysis of the standards applied
by each of the federal courts of appeals.
16. See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
17. Rajender, 546 F. Supp. at 165, 168.
18. Id. at 160.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 160-61.
21. Id. at 161, 170-71.
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Rajender $100,000 in compensatory damages" and required the
University to establish new hiring and promotion procedures.2 3 The
district court awarded attorneys' fees and costs in July 1982. "'
The court held that the appropriate standard for calculating
reasonable attorneys' fees is a "hybrid" of the adjusted lodestar stan-
dard."S The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit developed the adjusted
lodestar standard in an antitrust case, Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy).16 Lindy
requires a three-step calculation. First, the trial court must multiply the
number of hours spent representing the client times the attorney's normal
billing rate. The result is the lodestar figure. Second, the court may adjust
the lodestar figure to reflect the initial probability of success, described by
the Lindy court as the contingent nature of success. Third, the court may
further adjust the lodestar figure to reflect the quality of the attorney's
work.2 The Rajender court awarded a one hundred percent upward
adjustment for the contingent nature of success 28 and an additional one
hundred percent adjustment for the quality of the attorneys' work. 9 The
two adjustments had the effect of tripling the lodestar figure.
The University requested a ten percent downward adjustment
based on its status as a public institution. The court denied the
University's request, holding that the nature of the defendant was
irrelevant to an attorneys' fees award. 30
I. Background
Title VII's fee-shifting provision is an exception to the "American
22. Id. at 170.
23. Id. at 170-71. Among other things, the consent decree requires that the University of
Minnesota establish a temporary hiring quota for the Chemistry Department, undertake a
University-wide affirmative action program in employment with respect to women, appoint
a committee to review policies and practices which may result in discrimination against
women, and establish a procedure to resolve other claims of sex discrimination.
24. Id. at 158.
25. Id. at 163-64.
26. 487 F.2d 161, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited asLindy 1]. The court in
Lindy I remanded the case for a recalculation of the fees. On subsequent appeal, the court of
appeals affirmed its opinion in Lindy I and provided additional criteria for applying its
standard. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102, 116-18 (3d Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited asLindy HI].
27. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 167-68.
28. Rajender, 546 F. Supp. at 170.
29. Id. at 172.
30. Id. at 173-74.
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Rule" which requires all parties to a lawsuit to pay their own legal fees.3 ,
Major exceptions to the American Rule developed only in the past twenty
years . 31 Prior to that time, the courts created two significant exceptions to
the rule. First, using their equity power they assessed attorneys' fees when
the losing party exhibited "bad faith during the course of the litigation.""
Second, they assessed attorneys' fees when the litigation resulted in the
creation of a "common fund" to benefit third parties;" the prevailing
plaintiff collected fees from that common fund.
Congress created exceptions to the American Rule when it granted
courts the authority to assess fees as a remedy under certain statutes."
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was the first modern civil rights legislation to
include a fee-shifting provision.3 Subsequently, civil rights attorneys
attempted to expand the use of fee-shifting by utilizing a third judicial
exception, the "private attorney general" doctrine. " Under this doctrine,
courts award fees to plaintiffs who prevail on issues which further
congressional policy, even though the laws being enforced contain no
31. For a discussion of the "American Rule," its history and recent changes, see
generally, Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-19
(1967); Berger, supra note 11; Derfner, The True "American Rule". Drafting Fee
Legislation in the Public Interest, 2 W. New Eng. L Rev. 251, 251-54 (1979); Note,
Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney Fees Awards Act, 80
Colum. L Rev. 346, 347-50 (1980).
32. See Derfner, supra note 31, at 252 n.5.
33. Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
34. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307
U.S. 161 (1939).
35. See, e.g., Commodities FuturesTrading Commission Act of 1974 § 106,7 U.S.C. §
18(0, (g) (1976); Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981); Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 122,16 U.S.C. § 2632 (a) (1) (Supp. V 1981); Fair Labor
Standards Act Amendments of 1977 § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. V 1981); Veterans
Benefits Act § 784(g), 38 U.S.C. § 784(g) (1976). While the above statutes have
mandatory fees awards provisions, most fee-shifting provisions are discretionary. For
example, Titles 11 and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fees Awards Acts of 1976
grant courts only the authority to award fees. Therefore, the trial judge has the authority to
deny fees altogether. See, eg., Freedom of Information Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § § 552(a)(4)(E)
(1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 206(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(3) (1976); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § § 9(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § § 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976); Endangered
SpeciesAct of 1973 § 11(g)(4), 16U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1976); FairHousingAct of 1968 §
812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). See, Berger, supra note 11, at 303-05; Note, Awards of
Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 St. John's L Rev. 277, 320-24 (1982).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5(k) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976).
37. Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F. 2d 943, 951 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Brewer]. The "private attorney general" doctrine was an
extension of the "common benefit" exception to the 'American Rule' as developed in a
stockholder's derivative action. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). See
generally, Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
Harv. L Rev. 849 (1975).
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authorization for fee-shifting.3" Plaintiffs successfully employed the
"private attorney general" doctrine in several areas of public interest
litigation. For example, attempts were successful in school desegre-
gation 3 and environmental suits."' However, the doctrine was severely
curtailed by the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society." In Alyeska the Court held that Congress, not the
courts, should decide which policies require fee-shifting as an incentive to
private enforcement
41
Congress quickly responded to the Alyeska decision. In 1976 it
passed the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act,43 the first con-
gressional act which exclusively addressed the subject of fee-shifting." In
the Act, Congress identified seven civil rights statutes requiring fee-
shifting for effective private enforcement.4 5
The 1976 Fees Awards Act generated considerable litigation which
affected all fee-shifting statutes, including Title VII. 4' The Supreme Court
38. See infra notes 39-41.
39. Brewer, 456 F.2d at 945.
40. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 484 F.2d 1231 (1st Cir.
1973).
41. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
42. Id. at 269-71.
43. The 1976 Fees Awards Act provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this Title, Title IX of . . . [20 U.S.C. 1681 et
seq.], or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), amended by Equal Access to Justice Act, 5
U.S.C. § 500, 504 (Supp. V 1981).
44. Between the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1976 Fees Awards Act,
fee-shifting provisions appeared in othercivil rights legislation. Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976); Emergency School Aid Act of 1972,20 U.S.C. §
1617 (Supp. V 1981) (repealed 1978); Voting Rights Act Extension of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §
1973(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Equal Employment Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
45. The statutes referred to in § 1988 are: 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (racial
discrimination in employment and contracts); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(racial discrimination in property transactions); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights by state and local officials); 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (anti-civil rights conspiracies); 42 U.S.C. § 1986
(1976) (official toleration of anti-civil rights conspiracies); 20 U.S.C. § § 1681-1686
(1976) (Title IX) (discrimination based on sex or visual impairment in federally assisted
education programs); and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Title VI) (racial
discrimination in federally assisted programs).
46. See generally, Note, supra note 35, at 277; Comment, Computing Reasonable
Attorneys' Fees: The Copeland v. Marshall Trilogy, 19 Hous. L Rev. 339 (1982);
Comment, The Scope of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act After Maine v.
Thiboutot, Maher v. Gagne, and Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 66 Iowa
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interpreted major aspects of the Act in a number of decisions. The Court
established a dual standard for prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing
defendants. Courts must award fees to the prevailing plaintiff unless
special circumstances exisL47 However, courts must deny fees to the
prevailing defendant unless the plaintiffs action was frivolous, un-
reasonable, or without foundation. 84 Additionally, a party can prevail for
L Rev. 1301 (1981); Note, supra note 31, at 346; Comment, Attorney's Fees in Damage
Actions Underthe CivilRightsAttorney'sFees AwardsActof1976,47 U. Chi. L Rev. 332
(1980) [hereinafter cited asAttorney's Fees in Damage Actions]; Comment, supra note 11,
at 331; Lipson, Beyond Alyeska-Judicial Response to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 22 St. Louis U.LJ. 243 (1978); Derfner, One Giant Step: The Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,21 St. Louis U.LJ. 441 (1977); Berger, supra
note 11.
47. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (interpretation of Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The Court inNewman said that a prevailing party seeking to
enforce Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee
unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id. at 402. The Court
later adopted the same standard for Title VII actions in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405,415 (1975), and Congress adopted the standard in the 1976 Fees Awards Act. S.
Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1558,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1976). "Special circumstances" are rare. They generally involve the "plaintiffs repre-
hensible conduct." See Note, supra note 35, at 327. Courts have defined what are not
"special circumstances." The following are a few of the examples found by one writer.
1. The plaintiffs judgment advances his cause only and not that of others.
Perez v. University of P.R., 600 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1979). 2. Only nominal
damages were awarded to plaintiff. Id. 3. An award of attorneys fees would
be an undeserved windfall for plaintiff. Sethy v. Alameda County Water
Dist., 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980)
4. Plaintiff was only partially successful on the merits. Id. 5. Plaintiff was
awarded money damages. Id. 6. Defendants believed the challenged statute
was constitutional. Johnson v. Miss., 606 F.2d 635, 637 (5th Cir. 1979).
7. Defendants acted in good faith. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Wash., 633
F.2d 1338(9th Cir. 1980). 8. Defendant's conduct was required by the state
legislature. Id. 9. The case did not involve "invidious discrimination." Id.
10. Plaintiff is financially able to pay its own attorneys' fees. Bills v. Hodges,
628 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1980).
Witt, The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 Urb. Law. 589, 603-04
(1981). See also Note, supra note 35, at 324-30.
The Second and Ninth Circuits treat theNewman standard differently and deny fees
where an individual plaintiff seeks money damages and "the prospects for recovery are such
that a competent attorney is willing to represent the plaintiff on a contingent fee basis."
Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072
(1979). Zarcone involved a private action brought under § 1983. Accord, Buxton v. Patel,
595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979). Other courts of appeals have yet to follow these decisions.
See, Comment, Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions, supra note 46, at 332.
48. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1978) (Title VII
action). One commentator suggests that courts are now less reluctant to award fees to the
prevailing defendant. The commentator supports the Christianburg standard and urges an
amendment to the 1976 Fees Award Act requiring "frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation" behavior by the plaintiff before awarding fees to a prevailing defendant. Note,
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fee-shifting purposes even if the parties reach an out of court
settlement.4 9
The Supreme Court also expanded the kinds of suits subject to fee-
shifting. The Court permitted the award of fees for successful suits
brought against state 0 and local governments."' It also permitted fee-
shifting against a state when statutory claims not specifically included in
Prevailing Defendant FeeAwards in Civil Rights Litigation: A Growing Threat to Private
Enforcement, 60 Wash. U.LQ. 75 (1982).
49. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
50. Suits against state governments may be barred by the eleventh amendment, which
provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
Unless eleventh amendment barriers can be overcome, no fee awards are available.
A series of cases have eroded this obstacle. In Ex Parle Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1907), the
court enjoined the attorney general of Minnesota from enforcing an unconstitutional act and
held "the state has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." Id. at 159-60. The Court, however, limited its
holding to injuctive relief. Under most circumstances states are not liable for monetary
damages. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577 (1946). The
Court permitted a limited form of monetary damages in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974). Damages assessed against the state for purposes of providing prospective injunctive
relief were held constitutional because they had only an "ancillary effect on the state
treasury." Id. at 668.
With respect to Title VII actions the Court permits money damages as well as
injunctive relief. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick the Court held
that since Congress enacted Title VII pursuant to fourteenth amendment authority,
eleventh amendment restrictions do not prohibit either monetary damages or an award of
fees. Id. at 456.
The Court held that the 1976 Fees Awards Act applied to state governments in Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). See Note, supra note 35, at 356-60; Comment, Suits
Against State Officialk" Attorney's Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 53 Tex. L Rev. 85
(1974).
51. Municipal governments are liable for civil rights violations under § 1983 as a result
of recent Supreme Court decisions. The Court held in Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that local governments, municipal corporations, and school
boards were "persons" subject to § 1983. Id. at 658-59. The Court held in Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), that a"good faith" defense is not available to cities in §
1983 actions. Since § 1983 comes under the 1976 Fees Awards Act, municipal
governments now have increased liability for attorneys' fees.
Because of the very broad coverage of section 1983 every conceivable civil rights
violation comes under this statute. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
[Vol. 1:355
the Fees Awards Act are joined with section 1983 constitutional issues
substantial enough to support federal court jurisdiction." The Court
expanded the use of Title VII's fee-shifting remedy when it held that fees
are available for services provided before a state administrative agen-
cy.5 3
Most recently, the Court addresed the question of whether a fee
award may include compensation for time spent on unsuccessful claims.
It held in Hensley v. Eckerhart (Hensley) that district courts may deny
fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims which are unrelated to claims
on which the plaintiff prevailed.
4
II. Acceptance of the Adjusted Lodestar Formula
The appropriate framework for calculating fee awards remains the
most confused and least resolved issue. In dicta, the Hensley Court
discussed some aspects of fee awards calculation but further confused the
issue by recommending elements of two differing approaches."
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983(1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Municipal Liability Under42 U.S.C. 1983:
Hearings on S. 584, S. 585, and S. 990 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on The Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981). See also Peters, Municipal
Liability after Owen v. City of Independence and Maine v. Thiboutot, 13 Urb. Law. 407
(1981).
52. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980). See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
(1980) (plaintiffs prevailed in the Maine state courts on a Social Security Act claim brought
under42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that statutory claims can be brought under § 1983
and therefore attorneys' fees are available. Section 1983 protects rights secured by the
Constitution and is covered by the Fees Awards Act). See, Comment, The Scope of the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act After Maine v. Thiboutot, Maher v. Gagne, and
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 66 Iowa L Rev. 1301 (1981); Comment,
Civil Rights Attorneys'Fees in Cases Resolved on State Pendent and Federal Statutory
Grounds, 130 U. Pa. L Rev. 488 (1981).
53. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
54. 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983) [hereinafter cited asHensley]. See infra notes 115-22 and
accompanying text.
55. Id. at 1939-40. Although the calculation formula was not in dispute in Hensley, the
Court took the opportunity to express its views on the subject. It recommended that a district
court judge begin with the product of "the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Id. at 1939. This calculation yields the
lodestar amount set forth inLindy 1, 487 F.2d at 167-68. The Court stated, in a footnote,
that the resulting product could be adjusted to account for one or more of the Johnson
factors. Hensley, 103 S.Ct. at 1940 n. 9. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
However, in the same footnote the Court cited Copeland, 641 F.2d at890. Copeland is one
of the most persuasive appellate opinions favoring the adjusted lodestar formula. The
Copeland court limited adjustments to the lodestar amount to the two factors first set forth in
Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168. It specifically rejected the Johnson approach. In short, the Court
says a district court may adjust the lodestar amount by one of the twelveJohnson factors but
confuses the subject by citing an opinion that limits adjustments to the two factors set forth in
Lindy L See infra text accompanying notes 136-77.
NOTE1983]
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit developed one of the two
approaches cited in Hensley. In Johnson v. Georgia Highway, Inc.
Vohnson),"6 a Title VII case, the court listed twelve factors that a federal
district court judge must consider in awarding reasonable fees. The
factors listed were:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
question; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services
properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment due to acceptance
of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or cir-
cumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the
undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases. 7
Although Congress adopted no specific standard when it passed the
1976 Fees Awards Act, it cited the Johnson approach with approval and
clearly indicated its intention that courts use the same approach in all
types of federal litigation."s In addition, many courts followed Johnson,
particularly in Title VII suits.5 9 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit's approach
received considerable criticism for a number of practical reasons.
Foremost is the lack of an analytical framework. Johnson requires a
district court to assess each factor, but mandates no further analysis. 60 As
one commentator observed:
Trial court opinions under Johnson typically consist of listing all or
some of the twelve factors, accompanied by a few conclusory
observations regarding each factor, and culminating in a flat dollar
award, no part of which is specifically attributable to any one
factor.
61
56. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). See Hensley, 103 S.CL at 1940 n.9.
57. Id. at717-19. The Johnson factors closely parallel the factors for assessing client fees
set out by the American Bar Association in Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For a factor-by-factor analysis of the Johnson factors, see
Comment, supra note 11, at 346-76.
58. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1558,94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1976). See supra note 14.
59. King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916
(1978); Barberv. Kimbrelrs, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978); Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d
541 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
60. 488 F.2d at 717-19.
61. Ramey, Calculation of Attorneys' Fees Awards in Title VII Actions Against
Private Defendants, 58 U. Det. J. Urb. L 609,625 (1982). Similarly, another commentator
noted:
The fundamental problems with an approach that does no more than assure
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Johnson provides no indication of the relative importance of each factor.
Factors (1), the time and labor required; (5), the customary fee; and (8),
the amount involved and the results obtained hint at a formula which
uses an attorney's hourly rate and hours expended, but the other nine
factors do not. No guidance is provided as to either the importance of each
factor or its relationship to the other factors.
Courts using the Johnson standard must also struggle with
overlapping factors.6" For example, factor (3), the skill requisite to
perform the legal services properly, relates closely to factor (9), the
experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys. Similarly, factor (10),
the undesirability of the case, may result from factor (2), the novelty and
difficulty of the question. 63 Also, factor (1), the time and labor required,
will largely determine factor (5), the customary fee. Johnson does not
explain how courts should interpret the relationships among factors. This
contributes to lack of uniformity in attorneys' fees awards.
Because Johnson only requires a recitation of the factors and a
discussion of their application, trial judges are free to subjectively analyze
each factor and arbitrarily award whatever amount they think reasonable.
Not surprisingly, one survey of cases found a 684% variance in the rates
of compensation awarded. 64 This unpredictability discourages attorneys
from representing clients who rely on attorneys' fees awards."3
Courts using the Johnson approach often award lower fees to civil
rights attorneys than they award to attorneys in other federal suits.
Moreover, the fees are often less than the amount the same attorneys
ordinarily receive from their fee-paying clients." Commentators suggest
the lower courts will consider a plethora of conflicting and at least partially
redundant factors is that it provides no analytical framework for their
application. It offers no guidance on the relative importance of each factor,
whether they are to applied differently in different contexts, or indeed, how
they are to be applied at all.
Berger, supra note 11, at 286-87.
62. See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Northcross].
63. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Copeland].
64. Comment, supra note 11, at 378, n. 234.
65. The size of an award should provide the incentive for attorneys to represent clients in
civil rights actions. Ideally, the standards for determining the amount of the fees awarded
should provide an adequate incentive without granting a windfall to the attorneys. One
commentator noted:
[T he tool [fee-shifting] is only effective when the award granted by the court
covers the expenses of litigation and returns to the attorney a profit
equivalent to that which he would have earned in his normal practice.
Note, supra note 31, at 372.
66. See supra note 11. Since theJohnson formula focuses on the establishment of a basic
hourly rate, a court does not consider multipliers or bonuses. As one report indicated-
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that the subjective, unstructured nature of the Johnson approach too
easily allows trial courts to express their own prejudices against public
interest litigants." One commentator finds this result particularly harsh
for Title VII litigants:
First, as an overwhelmingly white, male, middle-class group,
federal district court judges are often unfamiliar with or un-
sympathetic toward the interests represented by Title VII attorneys,
their clients and their cases. . . . A second judicial prejudice
which is relatively uncontrolled in fee decisions underJohnson is a
perception of Title VII litigators as zealots who do not expect or
deserve to be compensated comparably with their more affluent
equals in the commercial bar.6"
Whether or not prejudice enters the calculation, Johnson allows trial
judges to make too many subjective determinations.
Johnson's inherent problems led to the widespread acceptance of
an alternative approach. In Lindy,6 9 the Third Circuit used the adjusted
lodestar standard to award attorneys' fees to the plaintiff's attorneys in an
antitrust case. Lindy requires the court to first calculate a lodestar figure
by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate times the number of hours
expended representing the client. If justified, the court next adjusts the
lodestar figure to account for one or both of two factors: the contingent
nature of success and the quality of the attorney's work.
70
Other federal courts of appeals follow the Lindy standard in various
forms. The Second Circuit adopted the Lindy standard in City ofDetroit
v. Grinnell Corp. (Grinnell)." The District of Columbia Circuit adopted it
in Copeland v. Marshall (Copeland).7' The First, 3 Fourth," Fifth,"
In commercial cases, it has been the courts' willingness to enhance a lodestar,
rather than the hourly rates awarded, which has resulted in large fees. Until
recently, however, it was a major victory for public interest plaintiffs to
obtain an hourly rate which was truly reasonable; the application of a
"bonus" or"multiplier" to increase a lodestar in public interest litigation was
extremely rare.
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Comm. Report No. 39, (Oct. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Lawyers' Committee Report]. See also Copeland, 641 F.2d 880, 890
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
67. Ramey, supra note 61, at 626.
68. Id.
69. 487 F.2d at 161.
70. Id. at 167-68.
71. 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
72. 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Title VII suit brought against the federal
government). See discussion of the three Copeland opinions in Comment, Computing
"Reasonable"Attorneys' Fees: The Copeland v. Marshall Trilogy, 19 Hous. L Rev. 339
(1982). For more recent elaborations of the Copeland opinion, see Alabama Power Co. v.
Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Environmental Defense Fund v. E.P.A., 672 F.2d 42
(D.C. Cir. 1982); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States Dep't of Treasury,
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Sixth,7" Seventh," Eighth,'s and Ninth 79 Circuits also utilize parts of the
Lindy analysis although not all cases directly mention Lindy. Only the
Tenth Circuit"0 relies exclusively on Johnson, although it has never
addressed the question of an alternative standard. The new Eleventh
Circuit has yet to adopt a standard, but one district court in the circuit
followed the adjusted lodestar formula."
The approach taken by the Eighth Circuit is typical of the approach
taken by other federal courts of appeals. The court uses both the Johnson
factors and the Lindy formula. The trial court in Rajender cited three
recent Eighth Circuit opinions which illustrate this confusion."s In
Jorstad v. IDS Realty Trust, 3 the court stated that it followed the Lindy
formula,8 4 while inLadier Center, Nebraska, Inc. v. Thone"s it stated that
it had "expressly adopted the guidelines for attorney fees set forth by the
Fifth Circuit" in Johnson. 6 In Robinson v. Moreland8 7 the Eighth
656 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346,365
n.3 (1981) (recognized Lindy as appropriate for Title VII actions).
73. Miles v. Sampson, 675 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982); Furtadov. Bishop, 635 F.2d 914 (1st
Cir. 1980).
74. Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1981) (allows use of any Johnson factor
to adjust the lodestar figure). See Espinoza v. Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 532 F.Supp.
440, 450 (E.D.Va. 1982) (interprets the Fourth Circuit standard as authorizing use of
contingency adjustment).
75. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1980); One observer argues that the Fifth Circuit
approach is close to the Lindy standard in spite of the fact it authored the Johnson
guidelines. Note, supra note 35, at 342 n. 291.
76. Northcross, 611 F.2d at 624.
77. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982); State of Illinois v. Sangaro
Construction, 657 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1981).
78. Jorstad v. IDS Realty Trust, 643 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1981); International Travel
Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449
U.S. 1063 (1980); Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 594 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1979); Zoll v.
Eastern Allamakee Community Schhool Dist., 588 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1978).
79. Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977) (both Lindy and
Grinnell cited for support); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974)
(approval of both Johnson and Lindy). See Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water
and Power, 652 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1981) (uses lodestar calculation but does not
specify reason for adjustment of 75%, citing Copeland for support).
80. In re Permian Anchor Services, Inc., 649 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1981); Salone v. U.S.,
645 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980); Butler v.
Anderson, 614 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1980).
81. Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 521 F. Supp. 297, 299 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
82. 546 F. Supp. 164-65.
83. 643 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1981).
84. Id. at 1312-13.
85. 645 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1981).
86. Id. at 647.
87. 655 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1981).
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Circuit in effect combined the two. Robinson required a calculation of the
number of hours expended times a reasonable hourly rate but permitted
"a lesser award appropriate under the factors listed" in Johnson."8 The
Rajender court described the Eighth Circuit approach as the "hybrid
analysis." 9 Regardless of the name attached, Rajender strictly followed
the Lindy formula.
Since Johnson is actually more an approach than a formula, some
courts follow the Lindy formula without rejecting Johnson entirely.
Courts accomplish this in two ways. Some courts simply subsume the
individual Johnson factors into theLindy framework. 9 As pointed out by
the Fifth Circuit itself in Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 9'
courts may apply the Johnson factors in determining individual com-
ponents of the Lindy formula. 9 In Hensley, the Supreme Court suggests
using the Johnson factors to increase or decrease the lodestar figure. 9 The
vagueness of the Johnson factors makes it possible for courts to easily
adopt either approach. This is particularly true where courts, such as the
Eighth Circuit, accept both approaches.9"
Merging the Lindy formula and the Johnson approach is an
improvement over applying only the Johnson factors, but adopting the
88. Id. at 891. See Zoll v. Eastern Allamakee Community School Dist., 588 F.2d 246,
252 (8th Cir. 1978) (Johnson factors used to increase the lodestar figure).
89. 546 F. Supp. at 163-64.
90. As one commentator observed:
The Johnson approach, it needs to be emphasized, is not in conflict with the
lodestar method. Both the Johnson approach and the lodestar method utilize
virtually the same factors. The lodestar method simply goes a step further
and explains how the factors are to be used. As the court in Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), observed, the lodestar method
simply provides "a procedure for ordering the examination of factors. It
thereby complements the discussion offered in Johnson." 64 F.R.D. at
682.
E. Larson, supra note 15, at 136 (emphasis in original).
91. 624 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g granted, 684 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1982)
(affirmed in part, but remanded on other issues).
92. 624 F.2d at 583 n.15.
93. 103 S.Ct. at 1940 n.9. See supra note 55. See also supra text accompanying notes
87-89.
94. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. The court of appeals subsumes the
Johnson factors into the Lindy formula using both approaches:
The number of hours of work will automatically reflect the 'time and labor
involved,' 'the novelty and difficulty of the question,' and 'preclusion of
other employment.' The attorney's normal hourly billing rate will reflect 'the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,' 'the customary fee,' and
the 'experience, reputation and ability of the attorney.' Adjustments upward
may be made to reflect the contingency of the fee, unusual time limitations,
and the 'undesirability' of the case.
Northcross, 611 F.2d at 624, 642-43.
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Lindy formula by itself is an even greater improvement. The Lindy
formula limits the factors to a workable number and organizes them into
an understandable formula. The first part of the calculation, multiplying
hours times hourly rates to arrive at a lodestar figure, helps assure that
awards are based on actual effort and not results. 9 Lindy ignores the type
of suit or the amount of the damages in calculating the lodestar
figure. 96
However, the second half of the Lindy formula, multiplying the
lodestar figure to adjust for risk and quality of work, resurrects problems
first encountered with Johnson. First, it places no limits on the size of the
adjustments. Second, an adjustment based on the risk of nonrecovery is
necessarily arbitrary and reveals a judge's personal prejudices. Third, the
quality of work adjustment is too vague and tends to reward results rather
than input.
III. The Components of the Calculation
An analysis of the Rajender opinion serves to illustrate both the
advantages and disadvantages of the Lindy formula. The following
analysis examines each component of the formula, its function, and the
standards which govern its application. It will be useful throughout to
keep in mind the congressional policy behind awarding attorneys' fees in
civil rights actions. Effective enforcement of civil rights acts depends on
private action.97 Civil rights plaintiffs often have little or no money to
secure legal assistance9" so fees must be adequate to attract competent
counsel. 99
A. Hours Expended
The Rajender opinion began with an analysis of the hours
submitted by the plaintiff's attorneys. The defendants contested the
plaintiff's attorneys' submission of 5,000 hours'00 on several grounds:
Attorney time charges for clerical or paralegal tasks, time charges
where the chronological summary is blank except for the number of
hours charged, tasks unrelated to merits or fees, communication
with counsel handling other discrimination cases, duplication
caused by multiple substitutions of counsel in this case and by
performing the same task on more than one occasion.'
95. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
96. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 166-68.
97. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 6.
100. Rajender, 546 F. Supp. at 162.
101. Defendants Pre-hearing Memorandum Re Fee Application Proceeding at 35,
Rajender v. University of Minn., 546 F. Supp. 158 (D. Minn. 1982).
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Defendants also contested the inclusion of hours spent on post-settlement
administration and in preparing the fee application. 02 The court accepted
all hours as legitimate except those spent on nonlegal tasks such as filing
and photocopying.0 3 The court approved the time spent on post-
settlement administration and the fee application but removed those
hourp from the lodestar figure. It treated them as separate costs, costs not
subject to post-lodestar adjustment.'°4
Unfortunately, Lindy provided no specific criteria for deciding
which tasks required compensation. In Lindy, the Third Circuit said only
that a court must determine "how many hours were spent in what manner
by which attorneys." 05 This, of course, contributed very little to an
understanding of the proper criteria. The Senate Report on the 1976 Fees
Awards Act directed that attorneys receive compensation "as is tradi-
tional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time
reasonably expended on a matter.' "106 In Copeland, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia limited the term reasonable when it
held that reasonable hours are not the same as actual hours.,0 ' The
Copeland court reasoned that attorneys often decline to bill their clients
for all hours expended, but instead only bill their clients for a reasonable num-
ber of hours.'0 For example, in dicta, the Copeland court suggested exclud-
ing hours for nonproductive time or duplication of effort.' 9 The Supreme
Court recently recognized Copeland's "billing judgment" approach as
appropriate in determining the number of hours reasonably expended on
a case.
0
Disputes regarding compensable hours usually arise from one or
more of three issues. First, defendants often challenge the inclusion of
hours spent applying for the fees. A clear majority of the federal appellate
courts permits the inclusion of all hours spent on a fees application."'
They reason it would be anomolous to permit an award of fees but not
include hours spent applying for the fees."' Rajender followed the
majority view.
102. Id. at 39.
103. Rajender, 546 F. Supp. at 165-66.
104. Id. at 166.
105. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 167.
106. S. Rep. No. 1011. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976) (quoting from Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680. 684 (N.D. CaL 1974) ).
107. 641 F.2d at 891.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Hensley, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40.
111. Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d75, 77 (lat Cir. 1978); Prandini v. NationalTea Co., 585
F.2d 47, 53-54 (3d Cir. 1978); contra, E.E.O.C. v. Union Camp. Corp., 536 F. Supp. 64
(W.D. Mich. 1982).
112. See Lund, 587 F.2d at77.
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Second, defendants frequently allege that the plaintiffs attorneys
duplicated their effort. For example, defendants allege that more
attorneys than necessary participated in pretrial conferences. Courts are
not consistent in their approach to this issue. Some courts closely
scrutinize for duplication of effort. "3 Other courts, such as the Rajender
court, adopt the approach that such close scrutiny is an inappropriate
intrusion into a party's strategy."
4
Third, defendants seek to exclude hours for time spent on
unsuccessful issues or claims. While this problem was not at issue in
Rajender, it is frequently an issue in fee awards litigation. In Hensley, the
Supreme Court sought to provide guidance on the issue when it held that
"the extent of a plaintiffs success is a crucial factor in determining the
proper amount of an award of attorney's fees.""' 5 Although the Court
admitted it could not specify a precise rule or formula, 1 6 it held that
district courts must deny fees for unsuccessful claims which are unrelated
to the "ultimate result.""' The Court described related claims as those
based on either a common core of facts or related legal theories.' " Meeting
the relatedness threshold, however, does not assure full compensation for
all reasonable hours expended. The Court also held that "partial or
limited success" justifies a reduced fee even though all claims relate to
each other. " 9 On the other hand, the Court stated that an attorney who
achieves "excellent results" should recover a fully compensatory
fee.1
20
As the Hensley opinion illustrates, requiring courts to make
difficult, qualitative judgments regarding degree of success means that
compensable hours cannot be fairly determined under any simple
standard. Furthermore, allowing judges to assess the degree of excellence
or degree of success achieved in a suit ignores the clear congressional
mandate that attorneys representing prevailing plaintiffs receive full
compensation regardless of the kind of relief achieved.' Absent
113. See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 466 F. Supp. 732, 744 (D.R. 1979), affd, 616 F.2d
598 (1 stCir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980);Norhcross, 611 F.2d at641 a percentage
reduction for duplication).
114. 546 F. Supp. at 166.
115. Hensley, 103 S.C. at 1943.
116. Id. at 1941.
117. Id. at 1940.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1941.
120. Id. at 1940.
121. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Con& 2d Sess. 6 (1976). See Hensley, 103 S.CL at 1947
(Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the concept of awarding fees for input rather
than results, see Ramey, supra note 61 at 630-32 (contends that Lindy formula is preferable
because it bases fees on input rather than on results or on the amount of damages).
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evidence of bad faith, clear padding, or obvious inefficient use of time,
courts should take a liberal approach toward accepting all hours
submitted. Otherwise, courts will face the inappropriate task of second-
guessing plaintiffs' strategy. A liberal approach also reduces the oppor-
tunity for judicial bias to affect the result. This does not suggest that courts
should not carefully review all hours submitted. Courts should require
the detailed, regular reports described in Hensley.
B. Hourly Rates
Rajender turned next to the second step in the Lindy formula, the
determination of reasonable hourly rates. As with the hours determina-
tion, courts follow varied criteria. Lindy held that the "value of an
attorney's time generally is reflected in his normal billing rate."' 23 The
"normal billing' rate derives from the attorney's legal reputation and
status.'24 In Grinnell, the Second Circuit interpreted Lindy's "normal
billing" rate to mean the "hourly amount to which attorneys of like skill in
the area would typically be entitled for a given type of work."'2 3 In
Copeland, the District of Columbia Circuit ignored the "normal billing"
rate in favor of a "market value" rate.1 16 As defined by the Copeland
court, the "market value rate" does not necessarily conflict with the first
approach but rather supplements it. It focuses on the prevailing rate "in
the community for similar work."' Although the attorney's reputation is
a factor, the rate charged by others in the community receives primary
emphasis. The dispositive question for the Copeland court is not what the
attorney normally charges other clients, but rather what other attorneys
in the community charge for similar work.
Ordinarily, the "normal billing" rate and the "market value" rate
produce the same result, but for public interest practitioners the result
may be far different. Public interest attorneys often work for organiza-
tions which pay low salaries.'2  The public interest attorney who
122. Hensley, 103 S.CL at 1943 (Burger, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 167.
124. Id.
125. 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974).
126. 641 F.2d at 892.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 898. The Supreme Court recently granted c rtiorari to consider the question
of the appropriate hourly rate for attorneys who work for nonprofit organizations Stenson v.
Blum, 512 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 671 F.2d 493 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub
nom., Blum v. Stenson, 103 S.Ct. 2426 (1983). In Stenson the State of New York is
appealing a decision ordering it to pay $118,968 in fees to the Legal Aid Society. The Society
represented the prevailing plaintiffs in a class action suit involving Medicaid benefit
termination. The district court awarded rates averaging $100 per hour. Stenson, 512 F.
Supp. at 682.
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represented the Title VII plaintiff in Copeland worked for such an
organization. The "normal billing" rate will reflect the low salary and
produce an hourly rate much lower than the "market value" rate. Since
Title VII plaintiffs are often represented by low-salaried public interest
attorneys, using the "normal billing" rate allows courts to award fees at
undesirably low rates. The Copeland court asserted that such reduced
rates do not accomplish Congress' intent to encourage the private
enforcement of Title VII. As the court observed:
While some lawyers would assist in the private enforcement of Title
VII for a reduced fee, Congress has recognized that payment of full
fees will provide greater enforcement incentives. 2 9
The Copeland "market value" rate treats the low paid legal assistance
attorney the same as the high paid private attorney, assuming both have
equal experience and skilL
Notwithstanding the need to compensate public interest attorneys
at "market value" rates, the "market value" approach has a disadvantage
which is clear in the Rajender opinion: it is administratively cumber-
some. In Rajender, the court examined numerous affidavits and heard
extensive testimony from local attorneys in order to determine the rates
charged by other firms in the Minneapolis area.' 30 The defendants argued
that the rates requested were excessive for Title VII cases and not
reflective of awards given in other recent fee-shifting cases by the same
court.'' The court chose not to address either argument but rather
focused on the rate charged in all types of litigation. 132 This approach has
the advantage of treating Title VII litigators the same as other litigators
but requires considerable time, expense, and effort on the part of all
parties.
The "normal billing" rate approach offers two advantages. First, it
is administratively less cumbersome. Requiring affidavits from the
attorneys regarding the rates charged their own clients is far simpler than
surveying the local bar. Additionally, the "normal billing" rate might
attract experienced higher paid attorneys who would suffer if com-
pensated at a "market value" rate which is lower than their usual rate.
129. Id Copeland holds that lawyers who work for public interest organizations deserve
compensation at a rate comparable to the rate they would receive if they worked in the
private sector and not at a rate based on their salaries. 641 F.2d at 899-900. Accord,
Steward v. Rhodes. 656 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1981); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598
(1st Cir. 1980); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.21: 1302 (9th Cir. 1980); Glover v. Johnson, 531 F.
Supp. 1036 (E.D. Mich. 1982); contra, Alsager v. District Court, 447 F. Supp. 572 (S.D.
Iowa 1977) (fees based on legal services attorneys' salary).
130. 546 F. Supp. at 166-68.
131. Defendant's Brief at 55, Rajender v. University of Minn., 546 F. Supp. 158 (D.
Minn. 1982).
132. Rajender, 546 F. Supp. at 166-68.
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One commentator suggests two alternative solutions.'33 The first
requires the court to consider the rates charged by the defendant's
counsel. 3' The second calls for an annual district-wide survey of hourly
rates with the aim of establishing lower and upper limits. 3 ' Both
proposals are administratively feasible and treat all attorneys alike
whether representing Title VII clients or commercial clients. Both
proposals also accommodate the organizationally funded public interest
attorney without discouraging higher paid attorneys.
C. Contingent Nature of Success Adjustment
The Lindy formula next requires the trial court to consider
adjustments to the lodestar figure, focusing first on the" contingent nature
of success."' 13 6 The adjustment provides a means to compensate for the
risk undertaken in representing clients on a contingent basis."' It
accounts for the risk of nonrecovery of fees. 38 The court may increase the
lodestar figure based on the odds of success as viewed at the time the case
began.13 9 As explained in Lindy, this adjustment requires the court to
evaluate the following factors: (1) "analysis of the plaintiffs burden,"
which considers the complexity of the case, the probability of defendant's
liability, and whether the claims would be easy to prove; (2) risks
"assumed in developing the case," which considers hours risked without
guarantee of remuneration and out-of-pocket expenses advanced; and (3)
"the delay in receipt of payment for services rendered.""' 4
0
The Rajender opinion relied on each of the three factors in awarding
an adjustment of one hundred percent.'" Citing the numerous unsuc-
cessful Title VII claims brought against other colleges and universities,
the court found the plaintiffs faced a difficult task in proving their
claims. 42 The court recognized the many hours plaintiffs' attorneys
invested with no assurance of compensation." 3 The court also noted the
eight year period of litigation during which counsel received no payment
for services.'
Policy arguments strongly support an increase in fees to account for
the risk of nonrecovery. For Title VII claimants, financial resources to
133. See Ramey, supra note 61, at 640-41.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 641.
136. LindyI, 487 F.2d at 168.
137. Id.
138. Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 117 (further defines the post-lodestar adjustments).
139. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 893.
140. Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 117.
141. 546 F. Supp. at 169-70.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 170.
144. Id.
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secure legal representation are scarce. Frequently they cannot afford to
hire counsel from their own funds. One survey covering a five year period
found that over fifty percent of the Title VII suits in one federal court
district required legal assistance from legal aid societies or other public
sources." ' Therefore, many attorneys representing Title VII plaintiffs
know that compensation is unavailable for a losing claim. Since it is often
difficult to succeed with Title VII claims,2 6 little incentive exists to attract
competent counsel. The contingency factor provides that incentive.
Nevertheless, application of the contingency factor is arbitrary. For
example, the court in Rajender made strong arguments for increasing the
lodestar figure due to the risks involved but made no justification for the
amount of the adjustment. 14' The opinion indicated no apparent reason
why the increase was one hundred percent instead of fifty percent or two
hundred percent or some other figure. Without more, the contingency
factor suffers from the same deficiencies as the Johnson factors.I's It is
vague and easily subject to arbitrary manipulation. Unless the formula
requires a closer connection between the amount of the adjustment and
the risk involved, judges will apply their own subjective criteria. As a
consequence, the size of fee awards will vary according to the subjective
criteria applied. Attorneys will be reluctant to represent clients in lengthy,
difficult cases where the amount of compensation is so uncertain.
One commentator suggests criteria for applying the contingency
factor." 9 His proposed formula allows increases based on the odds of
success. For example, he would allow an increase of one hundred percent
145. Chatty, The Question of Job Bias, San Francisco Examiner & Chron., Nov. 18,
1979, (California Living Magazine), at 7, cited in Ramey, supra note 61, at 615 n.37, 628-
29 n.98. The Senate Report to the 1976 Fees Awards Act states:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to
enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private
citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the
Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity then citizens
must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these
rights in court.
S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). The Report also states:
Enforcement of the laws depends on governmental action and, in some cases,
on private action through the courts. If the cost of private enforcement
actions becomes too great, there will be no private enforcement. If our civil
rights laws are not to become mere hollow pronouncements which the
average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the traditionally effective
remedy of fee shifting in these cases.
S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Ses. 6 (1976). See Lawyers' Committee Report, supra
note 66, at 6 (study indicates that major firms in Washington, D.C. are unwilling to accept
lower rates of compensation compared with fees charged to fee-paying clients).
146. See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
147. 546 F. Supp. at 170.
148. See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
149. Berger, supra note 11, at 326.
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if the initial odds of success are even because an attorney working on a
contingency fee basis must pursue two cases of equal value to be assured
of compensation for at least one. The adjustment increases or decreases
depending on the odds of success up to a maximum of triple the lodestar
figure. ISO
Using mathematical odds reduces vagueness but does not remove
possibilities for judicial bias. If trial judges are truly good predictors of a
suit's success, the risk factor they determine should be included in the
Lindy formula. However, given the unknown variables at the outset of a
trial, it is doubtful that anyone can accurately predict the likelihood of
success. Much will depend upon the facts presented and the strategies
chosen as the trial progresses. There is nothing to indicate that judges are
good oddsmakers.
Critics contend that the contingency factor is not appropriate
because it tends to punish the less serious violator more than the willful
violator."' As one commentator observed:
[A] defendant who egregiously denies a plaintiff his civil rights
presents a case with a low contingency factor and is "rewarded" by
incurring a low fee. By contrast, a defendant who may not realize he
is committing a constitutional violation presents a close case--one
with a high contingency factor-and must pay higher fees.'
This result is particularly likely in Title VII suits. The most difficult cases
to prove often involve institutionalized discrimination. An example is the
corporation that feels it is an equal opportunity employer because in good
faith it appoints a few women to high level positions. Nevertheless, deeply
imbedded discrimination continues at all levels of the corporation. A
complaint in such a case is obviously more difficult to prove than a
complaint against a corporation which has a clear record of willful
discrimination. Therefore, the less willful violator pays larger attorneys'
fees than the more willful violator. While the above results appear
inequitable, the criticism does not focus on the major purpose of fee-
shifting statutes. Congress did not intend for courts to assess attorneys'
fees as a punitive remedy. Congress intended fee awards to encourage
private enforcement by attracting legal representation. 53
150. Id.
151. See Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights, supra note 31, at 375 (urges
the elimination of the contingency factor).
152. Id.
153. The Senate Report declares:
All of these civil rights laws (including Title \VII) depend heavily upon
private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if
private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the
important Congressional policies which these laws contain.
S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 2 (1976).
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The principle of rewarding attorneys for the risk of nonrecovery is
sensible, but remains subject to abuse if applied arbitrarily. Trial courts
need clearer standards. Congress might consider the use of a flat
adjustment for all cases that exceed a specific period of time without
compensation. For example, fees for suits completed in less than year
would receive a ten percent adjustment with an additional ten percent for
each extra year up to a maximum of one hundred percent. The increases
would apply to the lodestar figure calculated at the end of the liti-
gation.
An objective standard of this sort reflects, to a limited degree, the
factors which are the basis of the contingency adjustment. 1 4 It directly
reflects "the delay in receipt of payment for services rendered.""' It also
reflects the risks "assumed in developing the case""116 to the extent that
lengthy litigation indicates many "hours risked without guarantee of
remuneration.""' However, it does not necessarily reflect a heavy burden
of proof. While a mandatory percentage adjustment does not perfectly
reflect the actual risk of nonrecovery, it is more predictable and less
arbitrary than the current standards.
Alternatively, federal courts of appeals might fashion a standard for
determining a fair adjustment. Appellate courts could set lower and upper
limits on the size of the lodestar adjustment. Within that range, trial
judges would rely on the factors outlined in Lindy. 5 " If the plaintiff's
burden of proof is minimal, and the claim is settled quickly, the court
would award no increase. In contrast, if the suit is complex and extends
for several years, the court would double the lodestar amount. For cases in
between, the trial judge would have the discretion to award an increase
based specifically on the considerations suggested by Lindy: the burden
of proof, risks assumed, and delay in payment.'" 9 While it may not totally
eliminate the subjective nature of the contingency adjustment, setting
upper and lower limits should reduce the wide variation currently found
in attorneys' fees decisions. 160 Additionally, trial judges would retain the
flexibility to consider the individual aspects of each case.
D. Quality of Work Adjustment
The final component in theLindy formula requires the trial judge to
further adjust the lodestar figure to reflect the attorney's "quality of
154. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.





160. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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work." 6 Lindy allows either an increase or a decrease' 62 for "exceptional
services only."' 63 Courts which support the quality of work adjustment
limit its application to cases where the attorney was unusually bad or good
in relation to what is expected of an attorney at the hourly rate awarded in
the lodestar figure." 4 Lindy identifies two factors which may justify an
adjustment of fees based on quality of work: (1) the importance and extent
of the judgment or settlement, and (2) the valuation of professional
skills."' 5
In applying these considerations, Rajender focused first on the
economic benefit to the class to show the importance of the case. 66
Plaintiffs submitted evidence which claimed the benefits had a value of
$40,000,000.167 The court cited the "persistence," "thoroughness,"
"innovative prosecution," and "professional conduct of the plaintiffs
attorneys" as evidence of their professional skills. 8 Based on these
considerations the court arbitrarily awarded another one hundred
percent adjustment to the lodestar figure." 9
The quality of work adjustment is more vague than any other
component of the Lindy formula. For each of the three components
previously discussed, standards are available which help avoid totally
arbitrary determinations. Mathematical precision may not be possible,
but at least objective criteria are available. By contrast, no apparent
objective criteria exist for measuring "quality of work."
Even if courts devised a method for measuring quality represen-
tation, applying it would not further Congress' intent to encourage private
enforcement of the laws.' 7 0 It is difficult to believe that attorneys will have
a greater incentive to represent civil rights claimants if rewards exist for
exceptional skills. Public policy should encourage skillful representation,
161. Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 117.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 893. While the District of Columbia Circuit strongly
supports theLindy formula, it urges caution when using the quality of work adjustment. In a
recent opinion it stressed.
[An] adjustment for the quality of representation should not be routinely
awarded but only awarded in exceptional cases. An adjustment should not
be made out of sympathy for claimant's cause or to mollify counsel because
the lodestar figure claimed was reduced.
National Ass'n of Concerned Vets v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1329 (D.C.
1982).
165. Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 117.
166. 546 F. Supp. at 171-72.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 172.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 153.
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but the hourly rate awarded by the court more properly reflects that
goal.
The Lindy formula also allows the court to assess the importance of
the results obtained as an element of quality representation.'7 1 The Lindy
court observed that the amount of the recovery "may be the only means
by which the quality of an attorney's performance can be judged where a
suit is settled before any significant in-court proceedings."' 72 The results
may also reflect the importance of a judgment to others not a party to the
suit. For example, inRajender, the court cited the $40,000,000 benefit to
present and future third party beneficiaries as a justification for higher
fees.'7 However, the results obtained may involve either minimal
monetary damages or insignificant benefits to third parties. For instance,
a Title VII claimant who alleges discrimination in promotion may receive
a minimal damage award, but receive the actual promotion. In this
situation, given the minimal damages, courts which consider the results
obtained in assessing fee awards may limit fees rather than raise them.
This result now appears sanctioned by the Hensley requirement that a
district court consider the extent of the results obtained in calculating an
appropriate fee award.' 7' Thus, in a suit in which little or no monetary
relief is requested, the Court's holding may conflict with Congress'
directive that fees awards not be reduced because damages are "non-
pecuniary."'
The underlying principle of the Lindy formula is compensation
based on input rather than results. 7 6 It is a principle consistent with the
Congressional intent that civil rights attorneys be compensated for all
reasonable time expended on a case.'77 In contrast, both Lindy's quality
of work adjustment and Hensley's results obtained factor are inconsistent
with the principle of compensation based on input.
IV. Unequal Treatment of Fee Awards in Civil Rights Litigation
The most unusual aspect of the Rajender decision is undoubtedly
the award of fees triple the lodestar amount. ' 78 This resulted from the one
171. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 168.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
174. 103 S.Ct. at 1940. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
175. S. Rep. No. 101 1,94thCong., 2d Seas. 5 (1976); Nantyv. Burrows, 660 F.2d 1327
(9th Cir. 1982); Salone v. United States. 645 F.2d 875 (loth Cir.) cert denied, 454 U.S.
894 (1981); Milwe v. Cauvota, 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981); Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d
915 (1st Cir. 1980).
176. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168.
177. See supra note 121 and accompanying text
178. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court recently agreed to




hundred percent adjustment for the risk of nonrecovery and the one
hundred percent adjustment for quality representation.' 9 While
tIajender may indicate a change in judicial attitudes toward Title VII
litigation,'80 Title VII litigators rarely receive such generous fees
awards.'' Although the differential may be narrowing, surveys indicate
that courts are consistently more generous when awarding fees in
commercial cases. 182
This differential exists despite congressional intent and the nearly
identical language used in all federal fee-shifting statutes. The Senate
report to the 1976 Fees Awards Act unambiguously states:
It is intended that the amounts of fees awarded under S. 2278 [1976
Fees Awards Act] be governed by the same standards which prevail
in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust
cases and not be reduced because the rights involved may be
nonpecuniary in nature."'
Nevertheless, multipliers rarely exceed two in civil rights cases,8 4 but are
as high as four in antitrust" 5 and securities cases."16
As previously discussed, the differential may result from the
vagueness of the Johnson approach which easily allows judicial bias to
enter the calculation.'" However, as more and more courts adopt the
Lindy formula, they continue to award larger fees to commercial
litigators,"' suggesting that the Lindy formula is also susceptible to
arbitrary manipulation.
Other explanations may account for the more generous awards in
commercial suits. First, commercial suits often result in sizeable damage
awards. Second, courts view commercial suits as complex and difficult to
pursue. Third, some courts may desire to discourage civil rights
litigation.
Sizeable damage awards are common in antitrust litigation
because the treble damage provision allows courts to triple damages as a
punitive remedy. Treble damages provide a convenient reason to triple
the attorney's fees as well. No similar justification exists, however, to
support the tripling of fees in other commercial suits where treble
179. Id.
180. See supra note 11; infra note 242.
181. See Ramey, supra note 61, at 610 n.8-9.
182. See supra note 11.
183. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976). The Hensley court apparently
ignored this language. See 103 S.CL at 1941.
184. See supra note 11.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 15h (Supp. V 1981); see supra note 11.
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) 78r(a) (1976); see supra note 11.
187. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 11.
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damages are not available. Nevertheless, courts regularly triple fees in
these suits as well. Furthermore. the federal appellate courts repeatedly
hold that trial courts may not consider the amount of damages when
awarding attorneys' fees.'1 9
Another explanation for the differential is the judicial attitude that
commercial cases are more complex than other civil litigation.'90
Antitrust suits require extensive discovery and the proof of complicated
economic theories. Therefore, litigation often extends over a lengthy
period, putting the attorneys at extended risk of not being compen-
sated."'9 In such cases courts award large adjustments to account for the
risk of nonrecovery.'
92
For these reasons, Title VII litigators deserve larger adjustments.
Title VII litigation is also complex, lengthy, and subject to costly
discovery.' 9 A Title VII action requires initial litigation at the ad-
ministrative level before the action can be brought in federal courts.'"
Class certification is difficult.'95 Extensive discovery is necessary given
the heavy burdens of proof. ' 96 Plaintiffs must also contend with frequent
changes in the substantive law.' 97 An attorney who recognizes these
obstacles is not likely to represent a Title VII plaintiff unless adequate
financial incentives exist.
Finally, the difference may be a result of judicial prejudice. Courts
may wish to discourage civil rights litigation- they may view civil rights
suits as a nuisance. The difference may also reflect a judicial attitude that
some civil rights laws deserve less than vigorous enforcement. Given
Congress' clear intent that courts use the same standards for fee awards in
all litigation, one must conclude that judicial bias affects the results. As
one critic noted:
This extraordinary differential persists . . . in defiance of the
equally strong public policy considerations which underlie fee
awards in both commercial and civil rights spheres.' 8
189. See supra note 175.
190. Attorney Fee Awards in Antitrust and Securities Class Actions, 6 Class Action
Reports, 82, 133-34 (1980).
191. Id.
192. See supra note 11.
193. M. Berger, Litigation on Behalf of Women (1980). The Rajender litigation is a
prime example. The suit extended over a period of eight years during which the attorneys
faced the possibility of no financial recovery for the thousands of hours expended. Rajender,
546 F. Supp. at 158. For a discussion of the complexity of Title VII litigation see Ramey,
supra note 61 at 615-17.
194. Ramey, supra note 61, at 615-17.
195. Id. at 615.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 616-17.
198. Id. at 610.
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's opinion in Henslev is apt to
further widen the differential by imposing a more restrictive standard for
compensable hours in civil rights litigation. ' 99 The Court's opinion thus
makes it easier for judges to arbitrarily decide that some federal laws
deserve strong support while others do not.
V. Fee Awards Against State and Local Governments
The significant number of cases brought against state and local
governments offer another explanation for courts' reluctance to apply
larger adjustments in civil rights litigation.200 As public officials, trial
judges are sensitive to the concerns of the taxpayer who must ultimately
pay the fee awards. However, this rationale has limited validity and does
not account for the less favorable treatment also accorded civil rights
attorneys in cases brought against private violators.
The few courts which have addressed the issue disagree on how to
appropriately treat state and local governments as losing defendants.
Some consider the public nature of the defendant as a rationale to reduce
the amount of attorneys' fees.20 ' Others consider the defendant's status
irrelevant. 20
The defendants in Rajender argued that government violators
deserve deferential treatment.203 They requested a ten percent reduction
in the lodestar figure based on their status as a public institution. '20 The
court rejected their argument and denied their request.20 5
The defendants in Rajender relied on Ingram v. Madison Square
Garden Center" and Rios v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters Local
648.07 The courts in both cases held that the defendants' status as
199. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. Justice Powell indicates in a
footnote that the Hensley standards are "generally applicable in all cases in which Congress
has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party'." 103 S.Ct. at 1939 n.7. "Pre-
vailing party" suggests that Hensley only applies to fee award statutes that use such
language. Whereas all civil rights fee award statutes include such language, others do not.
For example, the Clayton Antitrust Act specifies that federal district courts may award fees
to "any person who shall be injured." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. V 1981). Whether an"injured
person" is synonymous with a "prevailing party" is an issue the Court did not address.
200. See 128 Cong. Rec. S4.876, S4877 (May 11,1982) (remarks by Senator Hatch) (an
estimate that 23,000 § 1983 suits were brought against state and local governments in
1981).
201. See infra notes 206-208, 212-19 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 209-11, 217 and accompanying text.
203. 546 F. Supp. at 173-74.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 482 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
207. 400 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd sub. nom., EEOC v. Enterprises, 542
F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977).
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nonprofit organizations was a relevant factor justifying reduced attor-
neys' fees. 08
Government and nonprofit organizations share similar charac-
teristics. Neither seek to make profit, both receive deferential tax
treatment, and both are exempted from various commercial laws such as
antitrust and securities regulations. However, there is one major dis-
tinction. Unlike nonprofit organizations, government depends on fund-
ing from a theoretically unlimited source. Government, therefore, has a
greater ability to pay attorneys' fees. Nevertheless, nothing in Title VII or
any other civil rights law gives nonprofit organizations or government
special immunity for civil rights violations. If liability exists, reducing
fees for either would weaken enforcement of these statutes.
The court in Copeland held the identity of the losing party was
irrelevant when determining fee awards.209 Congress specifically recog-
nized state and local governments as potential defendants in civil rights
litigation.210 The Senate Report to the 1976 Fees Awards Act stated: "It is
intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of cost, will be collected
either directly from the official, in his official capacity, from funds of his
agency under his control, or from state or local government"
Other courts argue that this approach unfairly penalizes taxpayers
for acts beyond their control.2 12 In Henderson v. Fort Worth School
District, 213 the court noted that the "financial burden of a fee award in this
case would fall on people who participated in no discriminatory act, the
taxpayers in the Fort Worth School District." 214 While this may be true, it
is also true that government officials swear to uphold the laws. The
Henderson logic suggests a governmental immunity from civil rights
violations. No such immunity exists, and correspondingly, there is no
immunity from fee awards. No doubt taxpayers will feel burdened but
such burdens will result in pressure for public agencies to comply with the
law.
In Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education,"' the Sixth Circuit
advanced a novel argument for reducing fees. It held that a substantial fee
award against a public school was counterproductive because it reduced
the resources available to remedy the violation.2 16 In Oliver, a desegre-
gation case, the court ordered the busing of school children. Although
208. Ingram, 482 F.Supp. at 928; Rios, 400 F.Supp. a 991-92.
209. 641 F.2d at 894.
210. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976).
211. Id.
212. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977).
213. 574 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978).
214. Id.




the reduction of the funds available to remedy the violation is unfortu-
nate, Congress intended that all defendants receive equal treatment.2"
The Supreme Court has given some support to deferential treat-
ment for governmental institutions. In Hutto v. Finne*,2  the Court said
that" although the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit attorneys' fees
awards for bad faith, it may counsel moderation in determining the size of
the award or in giving the state time to adjust its budget."2' 9 Taxpayer
burdens are real but consumer burdens also result from successful Title
VII litigation in the private sector. Every major corporation found guilty
of sex discrimination ultimately passes on its costs to its customers, just as
the Kalamazoo Board of Education passes on its costs to the local
taxpayer.
VI. Proposed Legislation
. The Reagan administration and key congressional leaders support
efforts to amend the standards governing attorneys' fees awards in Title
VII and other civil rights cases. They aim to restrict rather than expand or
even maintain the effectiveness of attorneys' fees awards. Their proposals
would restrict private enforcement by limiting fee awards in both general
civil rights litigation and litigation brought against government.2 "
Draft legislation circulated by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) seeks to strictly limit the government's liability for
attorneys' fees awards.2"' The bill affects fee awards in two categories of
litigation. First, it affects all suits brought against the federal government.
Second, it affects all suits brought to enforce a civil right protected by
statutes included in the 1976 Fees Awards Act.222
The OMB bill proposes several limitations. First, it limits the
hourly rate of compensation to the highest hourly rate plus benefits
payable to government attorneys in the civil service. 223 A similar standard
217. See Rodriquez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1249 n.32 (3d cir. 1977); Parker v.
Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Reed v. Rhodes, 516 F. Supp. 561, 569 (N.D.
Ohio 1981).
218. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
219. Id. at 692 n.18.
220. See infra notes 222-40 and accompanying text.
221. Unpublished draft of proposal yet to receive final approval by President Reagan,
prepared by Michael Horowitz of the Office of Management and Budget. See also Limiting
Lawyer Fees, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1982, at 10, col. 1.
222. OMB Bill, § 2.
223. OMB Bill, § 3(a)-(b). Congress recently enacted legislation which establishes an
hourly rate limitation of 875 for fees in suits where the federal government is a party. 5
U.S.C. § 504 (b) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1981). The Equal Access to Justice Act permits the award
of attorney fees to the prevailing party in all actions against the federal government not
covered by previous statutes. The purpose of the Act is to alleviate the burden on small
businesses and non-wealthy individuals who choose to contest the application of federal
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applies to rates for state or municipal attorneys.22 4 Second, it prohibits all
adjustments to the lodestar amount thereby eliminating contingency and
quality of work factors as permitted by Lindy. 25 Third, fees may only be
paid if they exceed twenty-five percent of the size of the judgment where
monetary damages are part of the final judgment.2 2 6 Fourth, fees must
bear a reasonable relationship to the damages awarded.
22 Fifth, attorneys
who work for organizations funded in any part by a government grant are
ineligible for attorneys' fees awards.22 s
Rather than attempt to equalize the size of fee awards for all
litigation, the OMB bill would widen the current inequities. Attorneys
would have much less incentive to represent Title VII clients with
complaints against the federal government, making it more difficult for
government employees to vindicate their rights under Title VII. Similar-
ly, it would adversely affect those seeking to enforce rights against both
private and public violators.
A similar proposal passed the United States Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution in the 97th Congress.
22 9 Sponsors
reintroduced it in January, 1983 at the beginning of the 98th Congress.
23
laws and regulations. H. R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong. 2d Seas. 5-6 (1980). There is
language in the legislative history of the Act to suggest the $75 limitation does not apply to
other fee-shifting statutes. 125 Cong. Rec. 21444-45 (1979) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
But it would not be surprising if courts attempt to apply the limitation by analogy to litigation
where the defendant is state or local government. If Dr. Rajender brought her suit today the
University attorneys might argue the Act's limitation should apply. This would reduce the
fees from $1,950,000 to $375,000.
The Act does not specifically provide support for post-lodestar adjustments as
allowed by Lindy. The University might argue, therefore, that multipliers are improper
against government defendants. One reported opinion said in dicta that the Lindy formula
applied to the new Act but no other court has yet to follow its opinion. Constantino v. United
States, 536 F. Supp. 60, 64 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
See generally Dods& Kennedy, The EqualAccess toJustice Act, 50 UMKC L Rev.
48(1981); Note, Will the Sun Rise Againfor the EqualAccess toJusticeAct?, 48 Brooklyn
L Rev. 265 (1982); Note, supra note 35, at 351-56; Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act:
How to Recover Attorneys'Fees and Litigation Expenses from the United States, 13 U.
ToL L Rev. 149 (1981).
224. OMB Bill, § 3(a)-(b).
225. OMB Bill, § 3(a) (fees shall not exceed lower of actual costs of government rate
figure).
226. OMB Bill, § 4(a).
227. OMB Bill, § 6.
228. OMB Bill, § 7.
229. S. 585,97th Cong., 2d Seas. (1982) (passed the Subcommittee on the Constitution
of the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 15, 1982). See 128 Cong. Rec. S.4876 (daily ed.
May 11, 1982) (remarks of Senator Hatch). See also Attorneys FeesAwards: Hearings on
S. 585 Before the Subcomn on the Constitution of the Senate Comn. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 2d Seas. (1982).




While the OMB bill affects all federal litigation, the Senate bill focuses
exclusively on civil rights statutes included in the Fees Awards Act."'
The Senate bill contains limitations similar to the OMB proposal.
For example, it prohibits adjustments to the lodestar amount.232 It does
not, however, attempt to limit the hourly rates as severely as the OMB
proposal. Under the Senate bill, attorneys' fees are to be set by
determining a "reasonable market rate." 2" described by the chief
sponsor of the bill, Senator Hatch, as the "usual hourly rate."2"' Senator
Hatch indicates that "[if] this is not appropriate, the market rate or a
reasonable hourly rate for that type of litigation should be used." '
Although the bill prohibits multipliers, Senator Hatch also indicated that
the hourly rate may include"a limited-for example, 20 percent-factor
to account for the contingent nature of success."2 3 6 Unfortunately, this
attempt to define a "market rate" is as vague as previous judicial
attempts.2 ' The proposal creates confusion because it prohibits adjust-
ments to the lodestar amount, while its sponsors support adjustments of
hourly rates to account for the contingent nature of success.
The effort to clarify the standard for setting hourly rates is
commendable, but placing special limitations on fee awards further
aggravates the less than equal treatment currently accorded civil rights
litigants.23 ' Both proposals widen rather than narrow the current
inequities in the treatment of attorneys' fees between civil rights suits and
commercial suits.
The authors of the Senate proposal admit they want to protect state
and local governments. The sponsors included the amendment to the
1976 Fees Awards Act in separate legislation which seeks to limit the
impact of recent Supreme Court decisions expanding the liability of state
and local government for civil rights violations. 2 9 In the aftermath of
231. S. 585 amends 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) by adding a new section, § 722A.
232. S. 585, § 722A().




237. See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
238. TheTexas State Legislature attempted to resolve the problem by limiting the state's
liability for attorney's fees under certain circumstances. H.B. 9, § 5, 67th Leg., 2d Called
Sess. (Tex. 1982). The act was found invalid when a U.S. district court found "that the
Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution requires that
federal court orders awarding fees under § 1988 prevail over any statutory limitation on
such awards." Ruiz v. Estelle, 553 F. Supp. 567, 575 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
239. S. 585. See supra notes 229-3 1.
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these decisions, the number of civil rights suits brought against state and
local governments increased dramatically 40 causing attorneys' fees
liability to increase simultaneously. 4 ' Nevertheless. critics of the
Supreme Court's decisions should seek relief in substantive law rather
than in the enforcement procedures.
VII. Conclusion
Both the Senate bill and the OMB proposal address the major issues
involved in the Rajender attorneys' fees decision. Although each adopts a
less vague standard than those currently employed, both proposals would
increase the bias against civil rights litigation and grant deferential
treatment to public violators. More disturbing is the recent Henslev
decision which adds to the vagueness of current standards and will surely
increase bias against civil rights litigation.
Congress should recognize the utility of fee awards and adopt
workable standards rather than seek to eliminate their effectiveness. The
Lindv formula does not provide the final answer. The quality of work
adjustment is vague and lacks sufficient public policy support. Although
the contingent nature of success adjustment supports the sound policy of
rewarding attorneys for the risk of nonrecovery, Congress or the courts
need to fashion less arbitrary standards. Establishing flat increases based
on the length of litigation or permitting judicial flexibility within lower
and upper limits are two suggestions.
There are indications that courts are beginning to treat civil rights
cases more generously. 42 Concurrently, public institutions are finding
themselves liable for a greater number of civil rights violations. As a
result, public criticism will surely increase. If Congress responds. it
should not ignore the underlying rationale for requiring the losing
defendant to pay the prevailing plaintiffs attorney's fees. Without the
availability of adequate compensation, civil rights litigants will be unable
to attract competent counsel. Congress should recognize that severe
restrictions will require the federal government to choose between more
costly public enforcement or nonenforcement. As the executive branch
240. See supra note 51.
241. See Municipal Liability Under 42 U. S. C. 1983: Hearings on S. 584, S. 585, and S.
990 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
242. Lawyers' Committee Report at 1, 5 (listing of recent cases where attorneys* fees
awards are more generous than in the past; a 50% increase in the lodestar figure appears
common).
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continues to reduce its efforts at public enforcement,24' incentives for
private enforcement become more essential.
Robert Miller*
243. See Reagan is Rebuked by 33 State Heads of Rights Panels, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12,
1982, at 1, col 3 (indicates that the Justice Department has reduced efforts for enforcement
of civil rights laws). See also Rights Unit Charges Reagan Officials Impede Law, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (members of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission allege that
high U.S. officials impede efforts to obtain data regarding the appointment of minorities and
women to federal jobs); E. Mincberg, A Retreat on Rights, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, at
E17, coL 2 (describes the Reagan administration's record on civil rights as a wholesale
retreat from enforcement).
* Robert Miller is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota.
